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The founders of Greek scientific thought believed justice in terms of equality. Cosmic equality, in 
fact, was conceived as the guaranty of cosmic justice: the order of nature is maintained because it is 
an order of equals. That the main components of the universe are equal was an old tradition in popular 
cosmology. In Hesiod earth and sky are declared equal (Theog. 126); and the distance between sky 
and earth is equal to that between earth and Tartarus (ibid. 719-25). Anaximander’s own cosmology 
is designed with just such a sense of aesthetic symmetry, with equality as the main motif: the intervals 
between each of the infinite worlds are equal; the intervals between earth, fixed stars, moon, and sun 
are also equal; earth and sun are equal. This is exactly the sense in which equality figures in the whole 
development of early cosmological theory from Anaximander to Empedocles: powers are equal if they 
can hold another in check, in a way that no one of them is more powerful than any other. The objective 
of this paper is to propose a cosmological interpretation of the term díkē in ancient Greek according 
to Aristotle, who establishes synonymy between justice and equality through the use of the «dividing 
line» paradigm. Aristotle reveals, in effect, that the words diksastḗs «judge»  and dikaion «just» come 
from the root díkē, «judgment or sentence», which in their turn are derived from the adverb dīksā, 
«division into two equal parts». Moreover, the adverb dīksā comes from the Greek root dís-, «divided 
into two parts, dichotomous», which in its turn is derived from the Sanskrit root *diś-(dik) whose 
meaning indicates the astronomical concept of the «horizon line», — i.e. the boundary line that divides 
apparently the cosmos in two equal parts, the Earth and the Sky. As said by Palmer and Gagarin, in 
effect, the meaning of the word Díkē is associated with making a «judgment or decision» between two 
contestants, that is, placing a «dividing line» (straight or crooked) between them. Furthermore, this 
original conception representing justice as a division of the cosmos into two equal parts, or cosmic 
dasmós, has its roots in ancient cosmogony not only Greek but also Indo-Iranian, Hindus, Old Persian, 
Egyptian, Babylonian and Chinese. To conclude, according to my research, also Plato could have used 
the paradigm of the «Line of the horizon» to explain his cosmological Doctrine of Ideas.
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It is as thought there were a line divided into unequal parts,
 and he took away that by which the grater segment exceeds the half, 
and added it to the smaller segment.
 And when the whole has been equally divided, 
then they say they have their own, — i.e. when they have got what is equal.
Aristotle
The traditional etymology of díkē is that it is derived from the root *deik- of the verb 
deíknymi, «to show or point out», whence díkē comes to mean «indication, direction, way, 
custom». Émile Benveniste, connects díkē also with Lat. dico, and concludes that deíknymi, 
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must originally have meant «montrer verbalement» and díkē thus originally meant «le fait 
de montrer avec autorite de parolece qui doit êre»: “Il s’agit d’une racine deik- qui donne 
respectivement di- en sanskrit, diś — en iranien, dico- en latin, deíknumi- en grec. Mais ces 
forme, si exactement correspondantes, ne concordent pas dans leur sens, puisque gr. deíknumi 
signifie «montrer» et lat. dico «dire». Il faudra done arriver, par un travail d’analyse, à 
dégager le sens qui expliquera que dike ait le sens de «justice». (…) Ce indications permettent 
de préciser le sens initial de gr. dike, en tant que terme d’institution. En comparant les formes 
skr. diś et lat. dicis causa, on voit que dix énonce cette fonction comme normative; dicis causa 
signifie “selon l’énonciation formelle”, ou comme nous disons “pour la forme”. On rendra 
donc dix littéralement comme «le fait de montrer avec autorité de parole ce qui doit être», 
c’est-à-dire la prescription impératif de justice” [Benveniste, 1969: 107-110]. Leonard Robert 
Palmer excluded this derivation arguing that there is nothing in Homer or Hesiod to indicate 
these original meanings, though strictly speaking we cannot rule out the possibility that díkē 
originally had  some  connection  with dico:“There is little doubt  about the basic  meaning  of 
this root *deik, which is exemplified in the verb deíknymi ‘I show, point out’. The root is 
widespread in many languages: for instance the German word Zeichen =‘sign, mark’ is 
cognate with our token. In Latin, too, the original significance ‘show, point out’ is present 
in such derivatives as ‘index, indicare’. The most common sense of the verb dico is, of 
course, the secondary one, ‘to say’, a development for which we have seen many parallels. 
But the original significance ‘to point out’, is present in such phrases as ‘iis istarn viam 
dico’. Examples from many languages show that the semantic field of this root bears a 
striking resemblance to that of modus, mark, and the rest.  But we should note that Greek 
shows no trace of the development ‘to say’, and so díkē cannot mean ‘pronouncement’ of 
the judge. Greek is faithful to the primary significance of the root ‘mark, indicate’, and so 
we must postulate for díkē the primary significance  mark or ndication’” [Palmer, 1950: 157-
158]. Rudolf Hirzel, also rejected this derivation on the grounds that the meaning «judgment, 
decision» is predominant in the Iliad, whereas the meaning «custom, way» only appears in the 
Odyssey and therefore must be a later development. He thus connects díkē with the verb díkein, 
“throw or strike”, and says it originally meant the «throw» of the judge’s staff in rendering 
a decision, and thence came to mean «decision». Though this conclusion is almost certainly 
wrong, Hirzel was right to emphasize the meaning «legal decision, judgment» and to call for a 
re-examination of the traditional etymology. A  new approach has been suggested by Palmer, 
who argues that díkē must be understood from the position it occupies in the semantic field 
disclosed by the study of Greek contexts; in fact, Palmer shows, on the analogy of words of 
similar meaning in other languages,  two basic meanings for díkē developed separately from 
this root *deik [Palmer, 1950: 153-154]:
(a) Mark: 
indication; point out, say. 
characteristic. 
aim, goal, winning post; throw. 
(b) Boundary mark:
(of space) limit; measure; territory.
(of time) opportune moment, appointed time, season, year. 
(metaphorical) dividing line, decision, judgement.
Section One. Inert Matter
Philosophy and Cosmology. Volume 18, 201724
From (a) developed the meanings «characteristic, traditional, proper behaviour»; 
from (b) the meanings associated with making a «decision or judgment» between two 
contestants, that is, placing a «dividing line» (straight or crooked) between them. Palmer 
confirms that díkē does not mean  «pronouncement of the judge» but in the sense of «boundary 
mark and dividing line» forms an integral part of that coherent structure of ideas occurs 
elsewhere in the Indo-European world and so justifies the postulate of an Indo-European 
origin. In ancient Greek, in effect, “this underlying notion of a judgment as the drawing of a 
line is made particularly explicit by Theognis, who writes, 453 ff: I must decide this díkē by 
carpenter’s line and set square’” [Palmer, 1950: 159]. Gagarin follows the conclusions of 
Palmer for the most part, and describes the semantic field of the word: “Díkē originally 
meant «boundary, dividing line», in particular the dividing boundary between two pieces of 
land or between any two property claims, the line being either «straight» or «crooked». 
From this meaning developed the use of díkē as a «ruling» or «settlement» which might be 
made (or merely proposed) between two parties in any dispute. Now the way in which these 
settlements were arrived at was somewhat different from what we know as judicial litigation 
today, and thus we must look briefly at the early Greek method of litigation. The process 
was as follows: when two parties had a dispute over land or other property (cattle, a wife, 
a murdered kinsman, etc.), they could settle the matter by force. If, however, they desired a 
peaceful settlement díkē, but could not agree to a settlement by themselves, they might agree 
to look for a third, disinterested person to propose a settlement (dikázein). They might agree 
to abide by the opinion of a particular judge (dikáspolos), or they might solicit proposals for 
settlements from several people and agree to abide by the one most acceptable to both sides 
(the straightest). In the process, each litigant might propose his own settlement (presumably 
in his own interest), and this proposal (or plea) would be his díkē. One important element in 
this process is díkē, an effective peaceful system for settling disputes. The people must submit 
to díkē, shun violence, and keep to their sworn oaths; the kings must administer díkē wisely and 
honestly. Straight settlements result in manifold benefits; crooked settlements lead to general 
decay” [Gagarin, 1973: 81-94].
So that, according to Palmer and Gagarin, Díkē means a boundary mark and more specifically 
a dividing line. But so fundamental a word of the moral vocabulary is not isolated. It implies 
a peculiar Weltanschauung which must reveal itself in other expressions dealing with the 
same sphere of ideas. If this idea of boundary or limit is focal, then we should expect to 
find that other terms for moral ideas harmonize with it. I shall try to demonstrate that such 
a structure, such a harmony, exist in Greek philosophy;  and, further, that it occurs in so 
peculiar a form that  it justifies a conclusion about  Indo-European  etymological origins of the 
word. Chiefly we note that the just man is endikos quite literally he remains “within his marks 
or limits”; unlike his opposite, who is ekdikos. But what are these limits? They are the limits 
of his proper portion or allotment, his Moira. Thus in Homer, and Ionian thought generally, 
we find a profound belief in Destiny (Moira) as an ordinance which limits all individuals 
powers, whether human or divine; and we see, moreover, that this ordinance is even more 
a decree of moral obligation than a barrier of sheer physically impossibility.
In fact, according to Francis Macdonald Cornford, Greek cosmological, political, and 
moral thinking was dominated by this notion of appointed portions and proper limits: “The 
framework of primitive religious representation in Greek polytheism or polydaemonism is a 
system of departments (moirai) clearly marked off from one another by boundaries of inviolable 
taboo, and each (department) the seat of a potency which pervades that department, dispenses 
its power with it, and resists encroachments from without” [Cornford, 1991: 38]. And again: 
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“We have dwelt upon these details in order to bring out the fact that behind the familiar sense 
of Nomos, custom, use, law, lie traces of an older spatial significance — the notion of a range 
or province, within which defined powers may be legitimately exercised — what the Romans 
meant by a provincia. This aspect of idea has becomes obscured to us owing to the prevalence of 
the scientific notion of Law, which has become associated which causal sequences in time and 
has lost it old connection with space. For the understanding of the Greek world, it is necessary 
to grasp that Nomos does not suggest uniformity of temporal sequence, but exercise of power, 
within spatial or departmental boundaries. We must think of Law as a dispensation or system 
of provinces, within which all the activities of a community are parcelled out, and coordinated” 
[Cornford, 1991: 30]. Cornford had pointed that for Greek religious representation, no less 
than for early philosophy, the most significant truth about the universe is that it is portioned 
out into a general scheme of allotted provinces or spheres of power: “The elements came into 
possession of their fixed regions when the first limits were set up by the eternal motion within 
the primary undifferentiated mass, called by Anaximander the limitless thing. The Gods had 
their provinces by the impersonal appointment of Lachesis or Moira. The world, in fact, was 
from very early times regarded as the kingdom of Destiny and (in the sense we have defined) 
of Law. Necessity and Justice — must and ought — meet together in this primary notion of 
Order, a notion which Greek religious representation is ultimate and unexplained” [Cornford, 
1991: 40]. Yet, if we reflect upon it, we shall see that some explanation is called for. In fact, 
Cornford explain that “Primitive beliefs about the nature of the world were sacred (religious 
and sacred) beliefs, and the structure of the world was itself a moral or sacred order, because, 
in certain early phases of social development, the structure and behaviour of the world were 
held to be continuous with — a mere extension or projection of the structure and behaviour of 
human society. The human group and the departments of Nature surrounding it were unified in 
one solid fabric of morai — one comprehensive system of custom and taboo. The divisions of 
Nature were limited by moral boundaries, because they were actually the same as the divisions 
of society” [Cornford, 1991: 55].
It is clear that early Greek notion of justice lends itself with seductive ease to application 
far beyond the bounds of politics and morals. To respect the nature of anyone or anything is 
to be “just” to them. To impair or destroy that nature is “violence” or “injustice.” Thus, in a 
well-known instance, Solon speaks of the sea as “justness” when, being itself undisturbed by 
the winds, it does not disturb anyone or anything. The law of the measure is scarcely more 
than a refinement of this idea of one’s own nature and of the nature of others as restraining 
limits, which must not be overstepped. Cosmic justice is a conception of nature at large as 
a harmonious association, whose members observe, or are compelled to observe, the law of 
the measure. There may be death, destruction, strife, even encroachment (as in Anaximander). 
There is justice nonetheless, if encroachment is invariably repaired and things are reinstated 
within their proper limit. The founders of Greek scientific thought believed harmony in terms 
of equality, to the point of identifying the concept of díkē with the concept of equality. In 
fact, cosmic equality was conceived as the guaranty of cosmic justice: the order of nature is 
maintained because it is an order of equals. “That the main components of the universe are 
equal was an old tradition in popular cosmology. In Jl. xv it is implied that the heavens, the 
sea, and “the murky darkness” are equal, since their respective lords are equals in “rank” and 
“portion.” In Hesiod earth and heavens are declared equal (Theog. 126); and the distance 
between heavens and earth is equal to that between earth and Tartarus (ibid. 719-25). Such 
ideas are mainly without even a semblance of physical justification. They boldly read into the 
universe that feeling for symmetry and balance which makes the Odyssey speak of a well-made 
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ship as “equal” and of a wise, balanced mind also as “equal.” Anaximander’s own cosmology 
is designed with just such a sense of aesthetic symmetry, with equality as the main motif: the 
intervals between each of the infinite worlds are equal; the intervals between earth, fixed 
stars, moon, and sun are also equal; earth and sun are equal; the two land-masses of the 
earth — Asia and Europe- are equal, and the two great rivers in each are equal and divide 
the regions through which they flow into equal parts. To cap all this with the equality of 
the opposites which constitute this world would be in fine harmony with the whole design. 
The argument in Phys. 204 b 24-29 takes us beyond this aesthetic presumption into physical 
reasoning: If one of the opposites were boundless, it would not only mar the architectonic 
elegance of the cosmology but would positively “destroy” the other opposites. Why so? 
Because — as we know from Fragment 1– the opposites are constantly encroaching upon 
one another. If one of them were limitless, there would be no stopping it by the rest, singly or 
in combination, for they are all limited. Its encroachment would continue until the rest were 
destroyed” [Vlastos, 1947: 168-169]. This is exactly the sense in which equality figures in the 
whole development of early cosmological theory from Anaximander to Empedocles. Powers 
are equal if they can hold another in check so that none can gain “mastery” or “supremacy” or in 
Alcmaeon’s terms, “monarchy” over the others. So that, if this equality of the main components 
of the universe is maintained, justice is assured, for no opposite will be strong enough to 
dominate another. When encroachment occurs, it will be compensated by “reparation,” as, e.g., 
in the seasonal cycle the hot prevails in the summer, only to suffer commensurate subjection 
to its rival in the winter. Gregory Vlastos says that we can speak of the work of Anaximander 
and his successors, as the naturalization of j u s t i c e : “Justice is no longer inscrutable Moira, 
imposed by arbitrary forces with incalculable effect. Nor is she the goddess Dike, moral and 
rational enough, but frail and unreliable. She is now one with “the ineluctable laws of nature 
herself”; Hesiod’s Dike, she could no more leave the earth than the earth could leave its place 
in the firmament” [Vlastos, 1947: 174].
So that, given a society of equals, it was assumed, justice was sure to follow, “for none 
would have the power to dominate the rest”.  This assumption had a strictly physical sense. 
It was accepted not as a political dogma but as a theorem in physical inquiry. It is, nonetheless, 
remarkable evidence of the confidence, which the great age of Greek democracy possessed 
in the validity of the democratic idea, a confidence so robust that it survived translation 
into the first principles of cosmology. It was Plato, the bitters critic of Athenian democracy, 
who carried through the intellectual and political revolution to a successful conclusion: 
the idea of republic. In his system, we find at last the explicit and thoroughgoing negation 
of Anaximander’s equalitarian universe. In fact, also for Plato, equality is an equivalence 
relation, that is to say one that is transitive, symmetric and reflexive. Equivalence classes pick 
out classes of people or things that are the same, or similar, in some respect or other. There 
are many such, and we need to specify in respect of what two things are or are not equivalent 
before we are saying, or asking, anything definite. I can be equivalent to you in respect of 
age, or height, or weight, and many equivalence classes — contemporaries, coreligionists, 
comrades — may be of great importance socially or politically. But equality, for Plato, is more 
than just an expression of sameness. It suggests also a possibility of being either more than 
or less than. I can be the same age as you, but if I were not, I should be either older than you, 
or younger. With human beings, however, there are rather few respects in which we can be 
properly measured. Age, height and weight apart, the ascription of most numerical measures 
is a dubious affair. That’s why Plato distinguished “geometrical equality” (same shape) from 
“arithmetical equality” (same size), and reckoned the former to be of great cogency among 
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Gods and men, while the latter led to the great injustice of assigning equal shares to equals 
and unequal’s alike.
Aristotle took over the distinction, and elucidated justice in terms of “proportionate equality”. 
In the Fifth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle establishes a link, even etymological, 
between justice, law, equality — so that it will be said that a law is politically just or right when 
it establishes a certain form of equality among citizens — and distinguishes between two kinds 
of justice in view of the kind of equality that is to be carried out: on the one side, distributive 
justice, on the other side, corrective justice. Distributive justice refers principally to the 
distribution of political and economic rights and duties among citizens, while corrective justice 
regulates in a normative way the private relations among citizens consequently punishing those 
who violate the laws. As regards distributive justice Aristotle manifests that, as it is difficult 
come to an agreement about the “criterion” that has to be adopted at the time of distributing 
economic and political rights and duties among citizens — but democrats put it in liberty, 
oligarchs in wealth and aristocrats in virtue — the medium term of distributive justice has to 
be a mean proportional among the three types of criteria (in a way that no one of them is more 
powerful than any other); and the unjust is what violates this proportionate equality. Corrective 
justice, in turn, has two dimensions: one that regulates the transactions that citizens establish 
among them voluntarily, such as the contracts of purchase, sale, loan for consumption, loan for 
use, deposit, letting, etc. (commutative justice); and another that disciplines those relations that 
citizens establish or suffer involuntarily and that can be fraudulent or violent, such as theft, fraud, 
assassination, false witness, defamation, insult, etc. (restorative justice). Aristotle tries to prove 
that, in each of these parts of justice, the proportionate equality is determined by calculating a 
mean proportional, either geometrical (mesotēs), or arithmetical (meson), according to what is 
said about distributive or corrective justice [Salamone, 2014: 207-221].
From an etymological point of view, Aristotle reveals that the words diksastḗs «judge» 
and dikaion “just” come from the root díkē, “judgment or sentence”, which in their turn are 
derived from the term díksē, “in two parts, bisection”, and from the adverb dīksā, “division 
into two equal parts”. Here is the famous text in which Aristotle establishes synonymy between 
justice and equality, through the use of the «dividing line» paradigm: “Therefore, the equal is 
intermediate between the grater and the less, but the gain and the loss are respectively grater 
and less in contrary ways; more of the goods and less of the evil are gain, and the contrary 
is loss; intermediate between them is, as we saw, the equal, which we say is just; therefore 
corrective justice will be the intermediate between loss and gain. This is why, when people 
dispute, they take refuge in the judge; and to go to the judge is to go to justice; for the nature of 
the judge is to be a sort of animate justice; and they seek the judge as an intermediate, and in 
some states they call judge mediators, on the assumption that if they get what is intermediate 
they will get what is just. The just, then, is an intermediate, since the judge is so. Now the judge 
restores equality; it is as thought there were a line divided into unequal parts, and he took 
away that by which the grater segment exceeds the half, and added it to the smaller segment. 
And when the whole has been equally divided, then they say they have their own — i.e. when 
they have got what is equal. The equal is intermediate between the greater and the lesser line 
according to arithmetical proportion. It is for this reason also that it is called just (dikaion), 
because it is a division into two equal parts (dīksā), just as if one were to call it diksaion; 
and the judge (dikastḗs) is one who bisects (diksastḗs)” [Aristotle, 1949]. Aristotle repeats 
with great insistence that the just is the equal, and this is therefore the first and fundamental 
notion of justice and law in him who, in his special mathematical phraseology, discusses the 
identification of justice with the idea of division into two equal parts. Actually, the adverb dīksā 
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used by Aristotle comes from the Greek root dís-, “divided into two parts, dichotomous”, which 
in its turn is derived from the Sanskrit root word * diś-(dik) whose meaning especially indicates 
the astronomical concept of the «Line of the Horizon», that is to say the apparent boundary line 
that divides the cosmos into two equal parts: the Earth and the Sky [Salamone, 2013: 307-327].
In point of fact, in Monier’s dictionary (1964: 479-480) all terms that come from the 
Sanskrit root *diś-(dik) — 2 f. quarter or region pointed at, direction, cardinal point — refer to 
the concept of the “Line of the Horizon”, which is the line that divides apparently the cosmos 
in two equal parts, the Earth and the Sky; the Horizon line also divides the Sky into four equal 
regions (the four cardinal directions or cardinal points, which are the directions of north, east, 
south, and west, commonly denoted by their initials: N, E, S, W):
– dik-kanyā, f. a quarter of the sky deified as a young virgin;
– dik-kara, mf ( ī ) n. youthful, juvenile = aruṇa (as making a the sun ) dik-karin, m. 
elephant of the quarter, one of the mythical elephants which stand in the four or eight 
quarters of the sky and support the earth;
– dik-cakra, n. the circuit of the quarter of the compass, the horizon;
– dik-chabda,  m. a word denoting a direction;
– dik-tata, m. the line of the horizon, remotest distance;
– dik-tás, ind. from the regions of the sky;
– dik-tulya, mfn. having the same direction;
– dik-pati, m. a regent or guardian of a quarter of the sky;
– dik-patha, m. the path of the horizon, the surrounding region or quarter;
– dik-pravibhāga, m. a quarter, direction;
– dik-prêksana, n. looking round in all directions;
– dik-śūla, n. sky-spear, any inauspicious planetary conjunction;
– dik-srakti, mfn. having the angles or corners towards the quarters of the compass;
Actually, all these terms indicate specifically:
(a): the Line of the Horizon;
(b): the region or direction of the sky lying under any of the four divisions of the Horizon;
(c): one of the four parts of the sky into which the Horizon is divided or the cardinal 
point corresponding to it; 
(d): a compass point or direction other than the cardinal points;
(e): a point, direction, or place not definitely identified.
As a matter of fact, both the astronomical description of the sky divided into four parts — 
“a quarter of the Sky” — and the geometric description of the four cardinal points — “the circuit 
of the quarter of the compass” — indicate the rational Horizon which is defined as the great 
circle of the celestial sphere whose plane passes through the centre of the Earth and is parallel to 
the sensible Horizon of a given position. But what is the connection between the concept of the 
Horizon Line and the idea of Justice? Is it possible that the Line of the Horizon refers precisely 
to the cosmological and moral concept of equality, which is determinate metaphorically by the 
division of the universe into two equal parts, Sky and Earth? This interpretation is coherent with 
the Anaximander’s cosmology; Palmer seems to confirm this hypothesis when he says that, from 
an etymological point of view, the core of the idea of justice revolves around the cosmological 
concept of division/distribution of the universe; Palmer also explains that this idea comes from 
the Greek cosmogony which Alcman, the oldest poet of the Greek choral lyric, writes about in 
his Partheneion. In this work, Alcman speaks of the cosmological myth of Aisa “the part, the 
assigned destiny” and Poros “apportionment, destiny, the allotted portion”: the two primal 
principles or Gods who realized the primary act of distributive justice, in other words the first 
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major division of the universe into two parts (the Sky and Earth), which Cornford postulated 
as prior to the emergence of the Olympian dynasty in the world. From a moral and political 
standpoint the myth is condensed in the maxim “let no man fly to heaven or attempt to marry 
Aphrodite” and expresses an important feature of archaic Greek morality: the necessity to not 
go beyond one’s own limits, to avoid falling into excess and to adequately fulfil the role or the 
part assigned by Moira. Greek morality is actually governed by the precept “know yourself and 
do not go too far away”: pleonexia is going too far away, or “having greater portion of destiny 
than just assigned”, hýbris, or “falling into excess” or transgression, invasion of the sphere 
which another person is entitled to occupy completely.
According to Cornford and Palmer, actually, this original conception representing justice 
as a divine division of the cosmos into two equal parts, or cosmic dasmós, turns out to be both 
spatial (Sky is separated from Earth) and temporal (day is split from night), and has its roots 
in ancient cosmogony not only Greek but also Indo-Iranian, Hindus, Old Persian, Egyptian, 
Babylonian and Chinese: “Before cosmology were cosmogony and theogony. Becoming was 
conceived as birth, and birth is the result of marriage. The primal marriage in the early 
cosmogonies is the union of Sky and Earth, represented in anthropomorphic religion of historic 
times by the ritual marriage of Zeus, or Jupiter, and his female partner. But Sky and Earth 
cannot meet in fruitful marriage till they have first been sundered from their original unity of 
form. The cosmogonies open, not with the marriage, but with the separation of Earth and Sky.” 
[Cornford, 1991: 66].
The representation is this: the world began as an undifferentiated mass, without internal 
boundaries or limits (the Anaximander’s boundless universe). This mass separated into two 
parts, Earth and Sky, which were opposed or contrary, male and female. Finally the male 
and female were united by Eros, the contraries were combined, and gave birth to individual 
existence to Gods, or to things [Hesiod, 2006: 126]. In agreement to the ancients, in fact, “Earth 
and Sky were one, as Melanippe the Wise, in Euripides, had learnt from her half-divine mother:
It is not my word, but my mother’s word.
How Heaven and Earth were once one form; but stirred,
And strove, and dwelt asunder far away:
And then, re-wedding bore unto the day
And light of life all things that are, the trees,
Flowers, birds, and beasts, and them that breathe the seas,
And mortal man, each in his kind and law
The Orphic cosmogony used by Apollonius Rhodius tells the same tale. In the Babylonian 
cosmogony, from which that of Genesis is derived, Marduk cut into two pieces the monstrous 
Tihamat, and one half of her he set in place, he spread out as heaven. The primitive Egyptian, 
likewise, described ‘Shu’ as separating the Sky (Nut) from the Earth (Seb). In the Taoism of 
China, an original Chaos splits of its own accord into the two opposed moieties called ‘Yang’ 
and ‘Yin’, the regions of light and darkness associated with heaven and earth” [Cornford, 
1991: 67]. Moreover, in my view, in the The Republic Plato uses the paradigm of the “Line of 
the Horizon” to explain his cosmological doctrine of Ideas, that is to say the epistemic process 
which, from the darkness of the doxa itself of the sensible world, moves progressively toward 
the light of episteme, of the intelligible world, thanks to the use of mathematics and especially 
of philosophical dialectic. Thus, political and moral issues are interwoven with those of 
cosmological and metaphysical order, as is prescribed, since the beginning of the Timaeus itself, 
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by reference to the dialogue that takes place during the literary eve, the The Republic. In fact, 
this idea of justice as an equal division of the universe can be further illustrated from several 
mythical passages in Plato, which describe the constitutional order of divine government in the 
Golden Age of Kronos. In that age, according to the Stranger in The Statesman, the revolution of 
the universe, under the guidance of Kronos, went in the direction contrary to its present motion; 
it was the dominion of Justice in the Golden Age, with which the prevalence of injustice in 
our own Age of Iron is in melancholy contrast. In Book XV of the Iliad, in fact, the Governor 
of the Universe, Kronos, divided the cosmos into equal parts among his sons Zeus, Poseidon 
and Hades: “For we are three brothers, born of Cronus and Rhea: Zeus and I (Poseidon), and 
Hades is the third, the lord of the dead. And in three lots are all things divided, and each took is 
appointed part (or privilege, or status) that corresponded to it. When we shook the lots, to me 
fell the hoary sea, that I should dwell therein forever; and Hades drew the misty darkness, and 
Zeus the broad heaven among the eater and the clouds: the Earth and high Olympus are yet 
common to all. Therefore, never will I live according to the mind of Zeus; no, masterful though 
he be, let him stay quiet in his third part” (The translation of Homer is from Cornford). In this 
passage, justice simply means “allocated part” or “lot”, and it is beyond dispute that from this 
basic meaning is derived the meaning of destiny. For at the end of the Golden period, Kronos 
let go the tiller and left the world to the reverse impulse of Fate and its own inborn desire. Then, 
all the Gods who in their several places had ruled together with the highest God, perceiving 
what was happening, in their turn left their divisions of the world-order without oversight. In 
the Critias it is declared that the Gods divided among them the whole earth, place by place, not 
as the result of strife, but peacefully by drawing “the lots of Justice”; and making themselves at 
home in their several countries, as shepherds over their flocks, they fostered us, their creatures 
and nurslings, ruling us not by violence, but by persuasive reason. Therefore, if we are right in 
thinking that díkē ultimately meant the division/apportionment of the universe into equal parts, it 
is clear that this division, as soon as it comes to be the work of a personal God, can be conceived 
as a nomothesia, — a laying down or fixing nomoi (laws) — ; and that this process is simply a 
redistribution to Gods and men of their domains, privileges and honours. Indeed, at the end of 
the Golden Age, when Zeus took his seat on the throne of Kronos inaugurating the Olympic 
dynasty, he immediately distributed to Gods their various privileges and hierarchically ordered 
his kingdom, partially confirming the constitutional system of Kronos and, simultaneously, 
extending it through other partitions. Aphrodite, for example, will be occupied with love and 
seduction; Hera with legitimate marriage, Athena with wisdom and war strategy, while Themis 
takes care of divine justice. As regards anthropoi, human beings, Zeus also wished to put them 
in their place by drawing a dividing line that definitively separated the immortal destiny of 
Gods from the human condition of andrei, as narrated in the myth of Prometheus which ends 
with Gods donating a kalon kakon (a good evil): Pandora, the first woman.
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